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This article shows why the non-existent 
political dialogue between Russia and Es-
tonia will hardly develop in the next five 
years and why Estonia can lose its signifi-
cance for the Russian foreign policy rheto-
ric and Russian mass media. This conclu-
sion is drawn from a medium-term forecast 
about the changing role of Estonia in Rus-
sian foreign policy. The forecast is based 
on the scenario methodology, which sug-
gests that the modern means of political 
forecasting make it possible to make con-
clusions not about the future states of po-
litical phenomena, but rather about the 
trends of current states, which are called 
scenarios. The article describes the four 
possible scenarios of changes in the role of 
Estonia in Russian foreign policy that are 
evaluated from the perspective of the de-
velopment of Russian-Estonian relations 
and factors affecting the probability of 
each scenario. It is shown that any change 
in the role of Estonia in Russian foreign 
policy depends not only on the specific ac-
tions of the Estonian elite, for example 
their readiness to change their position on 
the participation of Russian-speaking 
population in the democratic decision-
making process or the evaluation of con-
troversial events of the past, but also on the 
meaning that will be attached to these ac-
tions by the Russian elite. 
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There are two main problems in po-
litical forecasting that need to be re-
solved. They are the unpredictability of 
targeted revolutionary changes aimed 
at political development, on the one 
hand, and the unpredictability of spo-
radic political changes constituting the 
essence of evolutionary development, 
on the other hand. In an attempt to jus-
tify the possibility of scenario-based 
political forecasting in the conditions 
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of uncertainty, N. Yu. Blagoveshhenskij, M. Yu. Krechetova and G. A. Sa-
tarov come to the following conclusions: “If we cannot forecast the future, 
we can, at least, try to establish a link between possible variants of the future 
and the present” [1, p. 75]. The research tools used by modern political sci-
entists cannot ensure sufficient accuracy in describing future conditions of 
certain political elements. Thus, in the context of the objectives formulated 
in this article, it seems to be impossible to characterise the role that Estonia 
will play in Russia’s foreign policy after the period described as “a mid-term 
perspective” is over. However, it is possible to identify some trends that re-
flect changes in the current state of certain political elements. This approach 
enables us to analyse how the role of Estonia in Russia’s foreign policy is 
likely to change. In political forecasting, descriptions of such trends are 
called scenarios. It is worth noting that all scenarios always include an as-
sessment of the current condition of the element of the political world, 
whose development is to be forecast. Regardless of whether they are pro-
duced for a short-, long- or, as is the case in this article, mid-term perspec-
tive, forecasts are better suited for analysing the present than for creating an 
image of the future. It is the optimal context for considering the forecasts of 
Russia’s policy towards Estonia that, for many years, have been produced by 
the experts working under the aegis of the Academic Baltic Centre of Rus-
sian Studies at the University of Tarty (Estonia) (for example, see [2]). 
In effect, these forecasts are, firstly, assumptions about the steps that might 
be taken by Russia in the year following that of forecast production and that 
can be approved by Estonia. Secondly, they contain assumptions about the 
steps that Russia might not take because they could provoke criticism of Esto-
nia. Thus, when producing their forecasts, Estonian experts base their analysis 
not on the goals and objectives of Russia’s foreign policy but on the goals and 
objectives formulated within Estonia’s foreign policy (that will be based on 
approving of or criticising certain actions of Russia). This article follows the 
described pattern: it will not analyse possible actions of Estonia in a mid-term 
perspective but rather possible changes in Russia’s perception of these actions. 
Unlike the Estonian forecast produced for a short-term perspective of 1 year, 
our study focuses on a mid-term perspective of 5 years. 
 
The role of Estonia in Russia’s current foreign policy 
 
Today, the position of Estonia in Russia’s foreign policy is characterised 
by two trends. On the one hand, as an overview compiled by the Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2001 concisely states, “Russian-Estonian po-
litical contacts are limited” [3]. On the other hand, Estonia is assigned an 
important — though negative — role in the speeches of Russian political 
leaders and Russian mass media, which is disproportionate to its influence 
on trade and economic ties, and the more so political contacts. This assess-
ment suggests that fours scenarios of changes in the role of Estonia in Rus-
sia’s foreign policy are possible: 
1. “Stagnation” in Russian-Estonian relations — Estonia will still occupy 
a significant position in Russian political rhetoric (and vice versa). However, 
political contacts between the countries will remain limited. 
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2. “Oblivion” in Russia’s foreign policy — Russian-Estonian political 
contacts will remain limited. However, the country’s significance for Rus-
sian foreign policy rhetoric and mass media will decrease. 
3. “Unfairness” in Russian-Estonian political relations — frequent politi-
cal contacts will emerge between Russia and Estonia. However, their impact 
will be underestimated, and they will not be paid enough attention in Russian 
political rhetoric and mass media. 
4. “Improvement” in Russian-Estonian relations — frequent political 
contacts between Russia and Estonia will create a positive image of Estonia 
in Russian foreign policy rhetoric. 
However, the probability of any scenario does not characterise the devel-
opment of Russian-Estonian relations in a mid-term perspective, since it can-
not be described with high degree of accuracy. Even if research tools of mod-
ern political scientists were capable of identifying that the probability of the 
“oblivion” scenario were, for example, 60 %, the obtained results would be of 
limited importance. 60 % probability means that, out of 10 similar occasions, 
this scenario will unfold six times, whereas four times one of the three other 
scenarios will take place. However, in the modern world, there is only one 
Russia and only one Estonia. Even if there were an opportunity to establish 
that the given scenario unfolded on six out of 10 occasions, it would not mean 
that Russian-Estonian relations would inevitably follow this very path. 
 
Russia as a great power and Estonia as a small state 
 
At the same time, one can identify the factors either facilitating or hamper-
ing a certain scenario. In our opinion, the role of Estonia in Russian foreign 
policy rhetoric and mass media is determined by the idea of the Russian politi-
cal elite about the role of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Estonia 
in international relations and world politics in general. Today, most Russian 
citizens think of their country as a great power. In the first half of the 1990s, 
just a few people believed in the re-emergence of Russia as a great power in 
the world arena, whereas the attempts to speak of Russia’s greatness were 
characterised by A. A. Zinovyev as “mocking the people” [4, p. 285]. In those 
conditions, Estonia was perceived as a country that had an almost equal to 
Russia’s standing in the world arena and as a tough opponent of some of Rus-
sia’s foreign policy plans since it did not manage to become Russia’s partner. 
As early as 2007, Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Urmas Paet threat-
ened to obstruct negotiations between Russia and the European Union [5], and 
it was perceived as a serious threat in Russia. As a result, the role of Estonia in 
Russian mass media and speeches of Russian leaders increased significantly at 
the time. Nowadays, Russia is one of the “centres of power” [6] for the whole 
Baltic region, alongside the EU and the USA. Therefore, it is increasingly dif-
ficult for the Russian elite to perceive Estonia as a state capable of affecting 
Russia-EU relations, either positively or negatively. This situation is main-
tained by the trends that emerged in the EU in the conditions of the Eurozone 
crisis. Recently, the significance of non-formal institutions — for instance, 
summits of the leaders of major EU states — has increased [7, p. 130]. Estonia 
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does not take part in these institutions, and thus it cannot affect Russia-EU re-
lations either in the understanding of Russian political elite or in the reality. 
In these conditions, the role of Estonia in Russian foreign policy rhetoric 
and mass media could increase through multilateral cooperation. For example, 
according to A. P. Klemeshev, G. M. Fedorov and Yu. M. Zverev, the prospect 
of innovative cooperation between Russia and Estonia facilitates the “forma-
tion of the Gulf of Finland growth triangle” [8, p. 95]. This initiative suggests 
active participation of Russia, Estonia and Finland. However, as the experi-
ence of international cooperation in the Nord Stream construction shows, Es-
tonia will not be ready to participate in any forms of multilateral cooperation 
in the near future, even if the third party is represented by a EU partner — for 
instance, Germany or Finland. It is likely that the potential of the “Gulf of Fin-
land growth triangle” will not be fully developed in a mid-term perspective, 
predominantly, due to Estonia’s position. 
 
Cross-border cooperation 
 
In a mid-term perspective, the role of Estonia in Russia’s foreign policy 
rhetoric and mass media could increase through cross-border cooperation. How-
ever, it requires large projects to be launched in the framework of cross-border 
cooperation, which is not probable at the moment. Neither the potential of Esto-
nia, the more so its eastern regions, nor that of the Leningrad and Pskov regions 
of the Russian Federation situated in the vicinity of the Russian-Estonian border 
gives any reasons to expect the launch of large projects involving a great num-
ber of regions from Russia and the EU. Similar to the case of the Russian-Esto-
nian-Finnish “growth triangle”, the probability that successful cooperation will 
develop in a mid-term perspective is rather low. 
On the contrary, there is an emerging tendency towards a decrease in the 
number of participants of cross-border projects as well as their narrower scope. In 
the late 1990s, cross-border cooperation was trilateral (Russian, Estonian and 
Latvian border regions). A special council supervised cooperation of the coun-
tries’ border regions [9, p. 62]. Today, cross-border interactions are bilateral: 
Russian-Estonian projects are implemented separately from Russian-Latvian 
ones. At the same time, the municipalities and authorities of Estonia and Latvia 
— two EU countries that have not managed to forge good-neighbourly relations 
— cannot be held fully responsible for these developments. One of the obstacle 
is the reluctance of Russian regional elites — first of all, those of the Pskov re-
gion — which was emphasised by A. Makarychev as early as a decade ago [10]. 
Focusing on the case of Estonia, N. M. Mezhevich demonstrates that the 
presence or absence of a cross-border agreement between two countries has no 
effect on the intensity of cross-border cooperation [11]. Even if in a mid-term 
perspective a cross-border agreement between Russia and Estonia is signed, it 
will not facilitate the emergence of major cross-border cooperation projects, nor 
will it increase the role of Estonia in Russian foreign policy rhetoric and mass 
media. On the contrary, one can assume that its role will even decrease: as long 
as the agreement remains unsigned, related debates arouse certain interest. It was 
the case in 2005, when, after signing the agreement, the Russian party withdrew 
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the signature of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs S. V. Lavrov; in 2007, when 
the cross-border agreement with Latvia was signed and ratified; in 2013, when 
new hopes for the signing and ratification of the agreement emerged. When the 
agreement is finally signed, the topic for media debates will disappear. 
 
Historical issues and the problem of Russian-speaking population 
 
As it was mentioned above, the emergence of a currently non-existent po-
litical dialogue between Russia and Estonia will not immediately increase the 
role of the country in Russian foreign policy rhetoric and mass media. More-
over, there are no factors that could facilitate the emergence of a dialogue be-
tween the two countries in a mid-term perspective. However, there are factors 
that will hamper such a dialogue. Firstly, it is the differences in the Russian 
and Estonian assessment of certain events of the past — predominantly, those 
of the 1940s. Secondly, it is Estonia’s current ethnopolitical model, according 
to which hundreds of thousands of Russian-speaking population permanently 
residing in the country over several decades are excluded from the democratic 
process of decision making. They cannot affect either the public policy in edu-
cation and culture, or the official interpretation of the past. 
The recent experience of Russian-Polish relations suggests that arguments 
over the assessment of certain events of the past, which hinder the development of 
a political dialogue between countries, can be successfully resolved to the mutual 
satisfaction of the parties [12]. However, this path chosen for resolving arguments 
over the assessment of historical events by Russia and Poland is not suitable for 
Russian-Estonian relations, where the problems of historical assessments and in-
clusion of Russian-speaking population in the democratic process of decision 
making are closely intertwined. More than 20 years ago, when Estonia’s modern 
ethnopolitical model was being developed, the country’s political elite was guided 
by the concerns that the Russian-speaking population residing in Estonia would 
become a “fifth column” and promote Russian interests. That is why they were 
excluded from the decision making process. As G. Smith and A. Wilson empha-
sise, similar concerns were expressed by the Ukrainian leadership [13]. 
Since the emergence of Estonia’s ethnopolitical mode over 20 years ago, a 
reverse situation has developed. Russian-speaking population residing in Es-
tonia do not promote the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation. 
However, the protection of interests of Russian-speaking population — that is 
excluded from the democratic process of political decision making and thus is 
unable to guard their interests through the Estonian political institutions — has 
become one of the key objectives of Russia’s foreign policy. It is not the Rus-
sian-speaking population that make Estonian authorities abandon the assess-
ment of the events of 1940 as the occupation of Estonia by the Soviet Union in 
order to legitimate Russia’s current foreign policy towards Estonia. It is Russia 
that is not inclined to acknowledge the “occupation” to avoid the Estonian 
Russian-speaking population being labelled as “occupants” and further ex-
cluded from the democratic process of decision making. 
While Russia’s diplomacy continues to emphasise the stability of its posi-
tion on the interpretation of the events of 1940 and the protection of the inter-
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ests of Russian-speaking population, Russian scholars suggest compromise 
interpretations that would satisfy all the parties involved — the Russian Fed-
eration, the Republic of Estonia and the Estonian Russian-speaking popula-
tion. For example, K. K. Khudoley believes that these events should be con-
sidered as “sovietisation” of Estonia — a unique process that could be possible 
only in the Baltics, only within the system of international relations that 
formed after World War I, alongside the equally unique process known as the 
Anschluss in European historiography [14]. However, it seems that, in a mid-
term perspective, the Estonian elite will not be ready to discuss any compro-
mise interpretations of these significant historical events. 
 
*   *   * 
 
Therefore, the factors hindering the Russian-Estonian dialogue will pre-
vail in a mid-term perspective. These factors include, first of all, the continu-
ing exclusion of a significant part of the Russian-speaking population from 
the democratic process of decision making in Estonia and, secondly, the on-
going arguments between Russia and Estonia over the assessment of certain 
events of the past. If a political dialogue between the two states emerges in a 
mid-term perspective, it will not be a result of the elimination of the above 
factors but that of a decrease in their importance for Russia’s and Estonia’s 
foreign policy. 
It is reasonable to expect a transition from trilateral cross-border coop-
eration projects (Russia — Estonia — Finland and Russia — Estonia — 
Latvia) to bilateral ones, which will also narrow their scope and reduce their 
impact on Russia’s foreign policy, which has not been significant in the con-
ditions of the increasing role of Russia in international politics. 
A decrease in the significance of Estonia for Russia’s foreign policy 
should be considered at this stage as a positive scenario and a change in the 
role of Estonia in Russia’s foreign policy. The “oblivion” scenario can result 
in the emergence of a new basis for further development of bilateral rela-
tions. It can even lead to the unfolding of the “improvement” scenario. How-
ever, it seems to be possible only in a long-term perspective. In a mid-term 
perspective, the most probable scenarios are “stagnation” and “oblivion”, 
which do not suggest the development of a political dialogue between the 
two countries. The “oblivion” scenario is considered as positive, whereas the 
“stagnation” scenario means that Estonia will continue to play a significant 
but negative role in Russian foreign policy rhetoric and mass media. 
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